This article is a contribution to our knowledge of ancient Greek geometric analysis. We investigate a type of theoretic analysis, not previously recognized by scholars, in which the mathematician uses the techniques of ancient analysis to determine whether an assumed relation is greater than, equal to, or less than. In the course of this investigation, we argue that theoretic analysis has a different logical structure than problematic analysis, and hence should not be divided into Hankel's four-part structure. We then make clear how a comparative analysis is related to, and different from, a standard theoretic analysis. We conclude with some arguments that the theoretic analyses in our texts, both comparative and standard, should be regarded as evidence for a body of heuristic techniques. Ó 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
In most of the extant examples of analysis in Greek mathematical texts, the author begins by assuming that a certain object has been drawn, a number has been found, or a statement is true and then proceeds by investigating the mathematical consequences of this assumption. In a few cases, however, the author assumes that some relation holds between two objects, or ratios, and then uses the techniques of ancient analysis to determine what this relation is. We call this later type of argument comparative analysis, since what the mathematician is seeking is a comparison, or relation (r tcjqiriB), between the two objects, or ratios.
This paper is an investigation of comparative analysis. We identify and read the ancient texts that preserve arguments of this type, and we situate these within the context of ancient analytical practices. Finally, we argue that comparative analysis was actually used as a heuristic technique, and although its presence in our texts represents some rhetorical choice on the part of the author, it was originally not a primarily rhetorical device. When we speak of heuristic technique, we do not mean an automatic method for generating proofs and constructions, but rather a set of techniques that were useful in looking for them.
1 Hence, we must understand the method of analysis, in the loose sense of Polya and Szego's method, as an idea that can be used more than once. 2 Pappus, in the introduction to Collection VII, states that analyses are of two kinds, problematic analysis, which is "the supplying of what is proposed" (sò poqiqsijòm sot pqosahe msoB), and theoretic analysis, which is "the investigation of the truth" (sò fgsgsijòm sa ' kghotB) [Jones, 1986, 83] . Problematic analysis, then, is primarily about producing something, or finding something, while theoretic analysis is primarily about showing something, or proving something. In some sense, comparative analysis might be said to fit into both of these categories. Nevertheless, since in geometrical texts -and all of the comparative analyses we will study are found in geometrical texts -a problematic analysis always involves the construction of a particular geometrical object, it makes better sense to think of comparative analysis as a type of theoretic analysis. Indeed, as we will see below, the components of a comparative analysis bear a closer conceptual and logical relation to those of a standard theoretic analysis than to those of a problematic analysis. Hence, we will describe comparative analyses in terms of theoretic analyses.
Modern scholars, following Hankel [1874, 137-150] , have generally divided an analyzed proposition into two primary parts, which, in turn, each have two subparts: the analysis is divided into the transformation and the resolution, and the synthesis is divided into the construction and the proof.
3 In fact, however, most of the discussions of ancient texts in terms 1 This follows the usage of Hintikka and Remes [1974, 1] and agrees with the general sense of heuristic found in Knorr [1986] . Netz [2000, 143-144] , on the other hand, speaks of a heuristic method as a sort of mechanical procedure or algorithm that will automatically generate results and argues that Greek analysis fails to meet this restricted notion.
2 Mahoney [1969, 319] points out that Greek analysis is not a method in the sense in which the word is usually understood, and speaks instead of "a body of techniques, which was suggestive rather than proscriptive." 3 Note that the terminology is not always consistent. For example, Hintikka and Remes [1974, 24] call the transformation the "analysis proper" and Fournarakis and Christianidis [2006, 47] call it the "hypothetical part." Nevertheless, despite the difference in nomenclature, the divisions in the argument are maintained.
of this division have focused on problematic analyses. 4 In a theoretical analysis, however, a construction, although often present, is not an essential feature of the mathematical goal, which is the demonstration of some statement. 5 For this reason, in a theoretic analysis there is no resolution, and when there is a construction it is of a different logical status than a construction in a problematic analysis. 6 Hence, from a logical perspective a theoretical analysis simply consists of an analysis and a synthesis, both of which may, or may not, rely on an auxiliary construction.
Nevertheless, a number of the theoretic analyses preserved in our sources contain a section between the analysis and the synthesis. A theoretic analysis begins with the assumption of what is to be shown and then proceeds, by a series of deductive steps modeled on the argumentative practices of the Elements, sometimes combined with auxiliary constructions, to show that this implies some other statement that the geometer knows can be shown independently of the analytical assumption. In many cases this other statement is directly obvious, on the basis of the geometry of the figure, in which case the geometer will simply assert that it is so. In other cases, however, it may take some reasoning to show that this other statement is, in fact, true. We will call this assertion, or second stage of reasoning, the verification.
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The verification, then, shows that the final statement of the analysis is true, based on the geometry of the figure, or other considerations that are independent of the argument and assumptions of the analysis. The validity of the verification is sometimes so obvious that it can simply be asserted; 8 at other times, however, it requires an argument, which is again provided using the argumentative practices of the Elements. In this paper, we will encounter examples of both simple and extended verification.
It is important to note, however, that the length of the verification is, from a logical perspective, an arbitrary choice on the part of the geometer. As we will show below, even in cases where there is an extended verification in our sources, it is possible to continue the argument of the synthesis until the verification can be made directly on the basis of the geometry of the figure and the conditions of the theorem. Thus, the length of the verification represents, not an essential part of the logical structure, but a decision, on the part of the mathematician, about when it has become sufficiently obvious that the theorem can be written.
The extant theoretic analyses do not include a separate construction at the beginning of the synthesis, and if an auxiliary construction is introduced in the analysis, it is simply assumed as already having been constructed for the purposes of the synthesis. 9 Hence, following the assertion or argument of the verification, the synthesis proceeds to show that the claim made at the end of the analysis implies the analytical assumption, which was what we set out to prove. The proof often proceeds along lines very similar to those of the analysis, but in the opposite direction. In some cases, as we will see below, it follows exactly the same steps in the reverse order, but in other cases, the order of the argument can diverge somewhat from that of the analysis.
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Of course, this schema is an idealization that was not always followed in ancient practice. To get a sense of how the parts of the schema function, and to see how an actual argument can diverge from the model, we will look at the example of Collection VII prop. 26.
In the course of his discussion of Apollonius's Cutting off a Ratio, Pappus provides a lemma that, like most of the lemmas in Collection VII, demonstrates a fairly uninteresting mathematical result that was meant to be read in conjunction with the ancient work to which it refers, but that is, nevertheless, of real value to the historian of ancient mathematics.
In Collection VII prop. 26, with respect to Fig. 1 , Pappus shows that if a triangle ABG is cut by two lines, AD and AE, such that \BAG + \DAE = 2R, R = 90°, then (BG Â GD) : (BE Â ED) = GA 2 : AE 2 .
11 The text reads as follows.
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9 Such is the case in the example studied by Hintikka and Remes [1974, 26] , in which we see that their construction is an empty place holder. Indeed, most of our examples of theoretic analysis have only a single diagram, whereas most of the extent examples of problematic analyses from Hellenistic authors include two diagrams. This stresses the fact that Greek geometric problems are about the construction of a particular figure. 10 See, for example, the discussions by Saito [1986, 46-47] and Behboud [1994, [63] [64] [65] [66] . 11 In this paper, we use the expression (AB Â CD) for the rectangle contained by lines AB and CD and the expression AB 2 for the square on line AB. In the texts discussed in this paper, these expressions always refer to geometric objects and no reference to arithmetic operations is intended by our convention. Another feature of our convention is that we always inclose an individual object in parentheses. This produces some odd results in places. For example, "the line that is equal in square to four times TE by EZ" becomes ð ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi 4ðTE Â EZÞ p Þ to indicate that it is a line that is not specifically named, but is rather defined by the terms and relations given in the symbolic expression. See Footnote 30, below. 12 We have inserted various numbers and references in brackets into the text, here and in the following. We do this so that we can refer to specific parts of the text in our discussion and to refer the reader to theorems and problems that were available in the ancient literature that can be used as justifications of the mathematical argument.
The translated texts are divided into paragraphs, marked with numerals, as [1] , and into individual statements marked with an alphanumeric key, as [A1] . The numbers indicate the individual mathematical steps of the argument, which are, of course, somewhat arbitrary. The letters are taken from the name of the part of the proposition, as discussed below. An asterisk indicates a reconstructed step.
Although we include references to ancient works in brackets, it is unlikely that ancient readers would have been expected to consult the written works. Rather they would simply have been assumed to know the mathematics in question. Nevertheless, we have included these specific references to help modern readers stay mindful of the fact that these arguments were being presented in a context of assumed knowledge -what Saito has called the toolbox -which is often somewhat different from the assumed knowledge of a modern reader of mathematics.
This lemma is also discussed by Acerbi [2007, 490-491] .
[1] If there is a triangle, ABG, and two lines, AD and AE, are passed through, such that angles BAG and DAE are equal to two right [angles] , then it will be that as rectangle BG, GD to rectangle BE, ED, so is the square on GA to the square on AE. [Jones, 1986, 147] After the specification, in Section [1], the analysis begins with the construction of an auxiliary circle about triangle ABD and the secondary constructions of producing lines EAZ and GAH [A1]. As we see later, line BZ is also joined, but this is not mentioned by Pappus. The analysis, then, uses a series of deductive steps, [A2]-[A5], to show that the assumption that (BG Â GD) : (BE Â ED) = GA 2 : AE 2 -which Pappus never explicitly states as an assumption -leads to the claim that HG : GA = ZE : EA, which would be true if HZ k BG. Notice, that although Pappus uses the expression "it is necessary to seek if" such-and-such is the case, the steps of this argument can all be justified deductively by appeal to propositions in the Elements. What Pappus is establishing is other things that will be true of this particular configuration of geometric objects if he assumes what he is trying to show.
14 In other words, he transforms the argument into one of showing that the, perhaps, more obscure fact that (BG Â GD) : (BE Â ED) = GA 2 : AE 2 can be shown as a result of the more geometrically apparent fact that HZ k BG. Fig. 1 . Collection VII prop. 26. 13 We have not attempted to translate literally. Thus, we render só t \ pò sxm BCD as "rectangle BG, GD" and só a ' pò CA as "the square on GA," since a 
But it is. Since \BAH is the supplementary angle to \BAG, by Elements I 13, \BAG + \BAH = 2R, and by the original, nonanalytical assumption \BAG + \DAE = 2R; hence, \DAE = \BAH.
In this way, we see that the analysis could have been carried to the point where the verification follows directly from the original condition of the theorem to be shown, namely \BAG + \DAE = 2R. The fact that Pappus did not take this approach, but rather reduced the argument to one of showing that HZ k BG and then showed this separately, as a result of the condition, is indicative of a rhetorical, or expository, choice on his part. By dividing the argument in this way, he is drawing attention to the role that the fact that HZ k BG plays in the overall structure of the proof. He is indicating that the key to proving this theorem lays in first proving that HZ k BG. That is, we can understand why (BG Â GD) : (BE Â ED) = GA 2 : AE 2 is the case, when we see that HZ k BG. In this proposition, Pappus presents no synthesis, presumably because he thought it would be obvious on the basis of what he has already said. Nevertheless, for the sake of completing our discussion of the structure of an analyzed proposition, we can reconstruct the synthesis as follows.
We will begin by imagining that we have no analysis and that we are constructing a full synthetic theorem. Considering Fig. 1 , suppose we are given MABG with internal lines AD and AE, such that \BAG + \DAE = 2R, but with none of the other objects drawn in the diagram.
If the argument were to be made fully synthetic, the construction would proceed by drawing a circle through the three points A, B, and D [Elements IV 5] and extending lines GA and EA until they meet the circle at points H and Z [Elements I post. 2] . It would then proceed by joining lines AH, BZ, and ZH [Elements I post. 1] . With the construction of these auxiliary objects, everything is in place to complete the argument. In fact, however, the synthesis of an analyzed proposition always simply assumes the construction of the analysis.
In this case, the proof can constructed following the steps of the analysis exactly. We need not go through the steps of the first part of the proof; nevertheless, some attention should be paid to the order in which we would proceed. Starting from the given objects, MABG and lines AD and AE, along with the newly constructed objects, circle ADB and the lines inside it, we would show, following the same order as the verification, [V1]- [V5] , that HZ k BG. Indeed, this part of the full proof is simply a repetition of the verification and is never given in our sources. The second part of the proof, however, goes through the steps of the analysis, but in reverse order. Pappus' argument is fairly compact, but we may flesh it out in the synthesis. In the following, we give certain steps of our argument the numbers (S5)-(S1), to highlight the fact that each of these statements can be associated directly with the correspondingly numbered statement of the analysis. We begin with the claim, established in the first part of the proof, which is a repetition of the verification, that In this way, we see that an argument exactly mirroring the analysis can be reconstructed for the synthesis. In this regard, some questions about the reversibility of steps of the analysis may arise. We first note that all steps involving assertions of equality and substitutions, such as (S4) ! (S3) or (S2) ! (S1.i), are simply reversible. Furthermore, Elements V 16, used at (S3) ! (S3.i), is its own converse. Finally, the three propositions of the Elements that we used as justification for (S5) ! (S4), namely Elements I 29, VI 4 and V 18 , are all the converses of the related propositions that we referred to in the translation of the analysis, namely Elements I 28, VI 5, and V 17. Of course, Pappus does not refer to any propositions in his argument. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Pappus was well aware that the most obvious choices for propositions that could be used to justify his assertions all have direct converses. Hence, as Mahoney [1926, 326-327] has pointed out, Pappus probably treated the issue of reversibility, somewhat loosely, with the sensibility of a working mathematician who has a good grasp on which deductive steps are strictly reversible and which are not. From this perspective, it was obvious to Pappus, having arrived at the end of the verification, that a synthesis could be constructed straightforwardly on the basis of what he has said. So he simply asserts that the theorem holds.
With this discussion as background, we may outline the general form of a theoretical analyzed proposition as follows. Moreover, as we saw above, the verification is sometimes so short as to be a simple declaration of the fact and the synthesis is sometimes omitted. Nevertheless, although the construction, verification, and synthesis are all sometimes absent in our sources, the former is left out because it is sometimes mathematically unnecessary, whereas the verification and the synthesis are only left out because the argument is presumed to be obvious. 17 Where the synthesis is given, we may understand the geometer as making explicit to the reader the fact that the deductive argument presented in the synthesis is, in fact, fully reversible. Where the geometer regarded this fact as obvious, or trivial, the proof could be omitted. Finally, the geometer could emphasize a key step in the argument by concluding the analysis at this point and then confirming this point in the verification.
In order to develop a clearer picture of how the standard theoretic analysis works, we present the schematic in Fig. 2 . 18 The geometer begins with a conjunction of both the con- 16 It is worth noting that the rhetorical structure of the standard theoretic analysis is sometimes found internally within a normal theorem. In these cases, the mathematician assumes what is to be shown and then uses ratio and arithmetic operations to reduce this to something obvious, or more readily shown. See, for example, Conics III 24-26 [Heiberg, 1891 [Heiberg, -1893 Acerbi, 2007, 491-492] . 17 See, for example, how Hintikka and Remes [1974, [25] [26] explain in detail the full argument of the verification for Collection IV prop. 4, which Pappus glosses over with the remark "but it is" (e ' 0 rsim de ). 18 This schematic is not meant to describe the logical form of a theoretic analysis with any rigor, but rather to provide a visual representation of the argumentative structure we find in the texts. Nevertheless, these figures can be compared to those presented from a more rigorously logical perspective by Hintikka and Remes [1974, 36] and Mäenpää [1997, 217 & 224] .
The only substantial difference between our schematic and that provided by Hintikka and Remes [1974, 36] is the relationship of the Toolbox and Toolbox A , which will be discussed below.
ditions of the theorem, C, and the analytical assumption, A, which are both statements about a given, and specific, set of objects, x 1 , . . ., x k . 19 The analysis then proceeds by using the conditions of the theorem along with this assumption, C,A(x 1 , . . ., x k ), in conjunction with a toolbox of known theorems, allowed operations and possible constructions, Toolbox, 20 to derive a transformed statement of something else that will consequently be true of these same objects, T(x 1 , . . ., x k ). We represent the fact that the analysis is a series of steps with a broken line. Moreover, although the language of the mathematician often makes it clear that he or she is thinking of the analysis as a tentative argument about what will happen if A(x 1 , . . ., x k ) is the case, the argumentative strategy, is nevertheless, deductive.
The overall synthetic argument, which is broken up into the verification and the synthesis, begins with the conditions of the theorem in question, C(x 1 , . . ., x k ), now independent of the analytical assumption, and a toolbox of known results, possible operations, and auxiliary constructions now made specific by having actually been used in the analysis, Toolbox A , and proceeds to show, first, that C(x 1 , . . ., x k ) implies T(x 1 , . . ., x k ) and then, through a series of deductive steps, that T(x 1 , . . ., x k ) implies A(x 1 , . . ., x k ). The verification is essentially a single step, represented by a solid line, while the synthesis then proceeds through a series of arguments drawing on Toolbox A and more or less loosely modeled on the argument of the analysis, represented by a broken line. In many of the examples we will look at in this paper, the synthesis follows through the same series of steps as the analysis, but this is not at necessary. 21 We have represented the general toolbox, Toolbox, as floating freely, unassociated with any particular set of starting points. 22 Of course, from a purely logical perspective, some 19 That is, the objects with which a Greek analysis deals are always instantiated. This point is made quite clearly by Hintikka and Remes [1974, 35] . It may be appropriate to point out that x 1 , . . ., x k are not variables, but simply an unordered list of instantiated objects, such as line AB or circle CD. As Mäenpää [1997, 215] has made clear, it would be just as well to call these objects x. evertheless, we have used x 1 , . . ., x k simply to remind the reader that we are dealing with a set of instantiated objects that remains unchanged in the three parts of the analyzed proposition. 20 For the time being, because we are focused on theoretic analysis, we ignore the role of auxiliary constructions, but see Hintikka and Remes [1974, 41-48] and Mäenpää [1997, 217-226] . 21 This point is made in detail by Saito [1986, 46-47] and Behboud [1994, [63] [64] [65] [66] . 22 Hintikka and Remes [1974, 36] address this issue by asserting that both the analysis and the verification must have as premises an additional set of assumptions, which they call K, that are "a conjunction of axioms and suitable earlier theorems," and speak in terms of the conjunction of it with C,A(x 1 , . . ., x k ), when carrying out the analysis, and with C(x 1 , . . ., x k ), when carrying out the synthesis. As Behboud [1994, 61] points out, however, K is not given at the beginning of the analysis, but rather a set of useful theorems, operations and assumptions becomes established during the course of the analysis, which we call Toolbox A . This is what we have tried to capture with our use of the ideas of the Toolbox and Toolbox A .
The concept of the Toolbox introduced here is related, but not identical, to the concept of the toolbox as discussed by Netz [1999, 216-235] , who refers to, and draws on, a research project by Saito. The toolbox, as it is usually understood, refers to a body of accepted results and procedures that the mathematician can assume to be understood by the reader. These are usually collected in works like the Elements, Data or Spherics, but are not necessarily so. In our discussion of analysis, the Toolbox is a somewhat broader concept, which consists of everything the mathematician knows and can bring to bear on any problem or proof. In fact, however, this is often a similar set of results, most of which can be found in the canonical texts. In both cases, the toolbox is an assumed body of knowledge and techniques.
subset of this general toolbox forms the auxiliary assumptions that should be included at the beginning of both the analysis and the synthesis. From a mathematical perspective, however, the toolbox consists of everything that the mathematician assumes can be drawn into the discourse with no further justification -theorems that can be called upon, operations that can be performed, constructions that can be made, and so forth. The toolbox can be applied at any step of any part of the analyzed proposition. Hence, from the perspective of mathematical practice, the toolbox represents a sort of context of mathematical knowledge, in which the overall argument is assumed to take place.
One of the most important goals of the analysis is to decide what subset of the toolbox can be used in any particular theorem; that is, to determine of all the possible theorems, operations, and auxiliary constructions, which ones will be of service in producing the result we seek. 23 Although the synthesis may not mirror the analysis exactly, it will still draw on the same subset of the toolbox as the analysis and in roughly the same way. Hence, we may understand the analysis as both demonstrating that T(x 1 , . . ., x k ) implies A(x 1 , . . ., x k ) and producing a set of theorems, operations, and constructions that directly bear on the matter at hand, Toolbox A . This, then, becomes an explicit set of auxiliary assumptions for the synthetic argument, which we can be expressed by taking Toolbox A in conjunction with the conditions of the theorem, C(x 1 , . . ., x k ). From a practical perspective, Toolbox A furnishes the mathematician with everything that will be necessary for the synthetic proof.
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A logician might be concerned about the general validity of this method, since it is possible that not every step of the analysis will have a direct converse, but a working mathematician would be less fazed by this. On the one hand, one can always think though what theorems and operations, have converses as one goes, and on the other, the analysis is an analysis of a specific configuration of geometric objects, showing that A(x 1 , . . ., x k ) implies T(x 1 , . . ., x k ). Hence, it should generally be fairly easy to show that for this specific set of objects it is also that case that T(x 1 , . . ., x k ) implies A(x 1 , . . ., x k ), even if the argument one uses is not a direct converse of the analysis. In both cases, what one is concerned with is 23 Behboud [1994, 61] also makes this point, stating that finding this subset of the toolbox is "one of the heuristic tasks of an analysis." 24 An examination of the discussions by Saito [1986, 44-47] and Behboud [1994, [63] [64] shows that even in cases where the synthesis does not mirror the analysis, the Toolbox A , determined in the analysis and applied again in the synthesis, is the same. not a chain of logical inferences that can be derived from a certain statement, but rather the implications of that statement for a specific configuration of geometric objects.
As we saw above, not every theoretic analyzed proposition has such a simple verification. Sometimes the verification is extended into a deductive chain of reasoning. We can represent such extended verifications with the schematic in Fig. 3 .
In the case of an extended verification, the geometer argues from the conditions and the analytical assumption, C, A(x 1 , . . ., x k ), to some transformed statement, T 0 (x 1 , . . ., x k ), which is, in fact, not a direct consequence of the conditions of the theorem, C(x 1 , . . ., x k ). The verification then proves, through a series of steps, that T 0 (x 1 , . . ., x k ) can be derived from C(x 1 , . . ., x k ), starting with some immediate first step T n (x 1 , . . ., x k ).
When we visualize this in a schematic, it becomes clear that a theoretic analysis with an extended verification has the same global structure as a standard theoretic analysis, and that T 0 (x 1 , . . ., x k ) can be understood as simply one of the claims that is made along the way in arguing that A(x 1 , . . ., x k ) implies T n (x 1 , . . ., x k ). Hence, as we argued above, this form was probably not used for any compelling logical reason, but rather because the mathematician wanted to highlight the statement T 0 (x 1 , . . ., x k ) as somehow significant in understanding how the proof works, or why the theorem is true.
With this as a characterization of a theoretic analyzed proposition, we now have the background to begin an investigation of the type of theoretic analysis that we call comparative analysis. In a standard theoretic analysis, the mathematician assumes what is to be shown. In the case of our example, Pappus assumed that there is a relation of equality between two objects, in this case ratios. In the case of comparative theoretic analysis, as we will see below, the geometer assumes that there exists some relation between two objects, which is either greater than, equal to, or less than. In this case, the verification must determine which one of these relations holds, which is naturally also a proof that there is some relation.
Before discussing the structure of a comparative theoretic analysis and the relation between standard theoretic analysis and comparative theoretic analysis, we turn to some examples of this type of analysis that survive in our medieval sources for the ancient texts.
Examples of comparative analysis
So far, we have only identified two ancient texts that have clear cases of comparative analysis. These are Apollonius' Cutting off a Ratio and Book VI of Pappus' Collection. We will begin with an examination of the use of comparative analysis in Cutting off a Ratio.
Comparative analysis in Cutting off a Ratio
The earliest Greek author whose comparative analyses have survived is Apollonius. These analyses are found in his Cutting off a Ratio, a text presented entirely in the analytical mode. Although there are no extant copies of the Greek text, an Arabic translation, made by an unknown scholar, has survived [Rashed and Bellosta, 2010] .
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Cutting off a Ratio is an extended analysis that, over the course of some 55 manuscript pages, exhaustively solves the problem of drawing a line through a given point such that it 25 Since we will sometimes refer to the Arabic manuscripts of this text, we reference them as CR A for Aya Sofya 4830 and CR B for Bodleian Arch. Seld. A 32. These correspond to and respectively, in Rashed and Bellosta [2010] . falls on two given lines and cuts from them lengths, determined from the given points, which have to one another a given ratio. That is, given two lines ' 1 and ' 2 , and some point E on ' 1 , another point Z on ' 2 , and another point H on neither ' 1 nor ' 2 , and some given ratio r, to draw a line, HKL, such that
This problem is then solved for all geometrically different configurations of the given initial lines and points and for all possible solutions for any given initial configuration. The text is divided into dispositions (sópoB, ), for the different configurations of the initially given objects, and occurrences (psxriB, ), for the different possible positions of the cutting line.
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In order to see the full range of terminology dealing with comparative analysis in Cutting off a Ratio, we will look at the second and the fourth occurrence of the sixth disposition.
Cutting off a Ratio I 6 treats the following configuration. In Figs. 4 and 5, let ' 1 and ' 2 be AB and CD, and let the given point not on either of these lines be point H. The sixth disposition is specified by setting the given point E at the intersection of AB and CD, and setting the given point Z on DG, such that it falls between point E and point T, which is determined by drawing HT parallel to AB.
There are four occurrences, depending on how the line passing through H falls on the two given lines AB and GD. 26 The Greek terminology comes from Pappus's description of Cutting off a Ratio in his Collection VII [Jones, 1986, 87] . The Arabic terminology is used throughout the text [Rashed and Bellosta, 2010] . See Saito and Sidoli [2010, 596-597] , for a more complete discussion of these terms and our translation decisions. 27 In this summary, we call the intersection of HL and AB point K and the intersection of HL and GD point L. This conforms with our discussion of the four occurrences and should facilitate seeing the relationships between the various occurrences. In the text, however, following standard Greek practice, the objects were simply renamed, with no attempt to make them consistent from one occurrence to the next. Here we distinguish between points L, K, and M, introduced in the general analysis, and points L 0 , K 0 , and M 0 , which are special cases of these points introduced in the diorism.
In the text, there is no such distinction. Occurrence 1. In Fig. 4 , line KHL cuts off segment EK from ray EA and segment ZL from ray ZG. Occurrence 2. In Fig. 4 , line HLK cuts off segment EK from ray EB and segment ZL from ray ZG. Occurrence 3. In Fig. 5 , line HLK cuts off segment EK from ray EB and segment ZL from ray ZD. Occurrence 4. In Fig. 5 , line HKL cuts off segment EK from ray EA and segment ZL from ray ZD.
The examples of comparative analysis that we will examine are taken from Cutting off a Ratio I 6.2 and 6.4. These two occurrences are fairly long and the comparative analysis makes up just a small component of the overall argument. In order to situate these proofs in their contexts, and in order to understand certain steps of the argument, it will be necessary to give a summary of the overall argument of Cutting off a Ratio I 6.2. In the summary, we do not provide the full arguments or their justifications. In this paper, the only arguments that we treat in full are those that are handled using comparative analysis, which in this summary are designated as Diorism (b) and (c) (see Fig. 6 ).
Analysis. The general analysis shows that if we draw HT such that HT k AB, and if point M is determined by relation TH : ZM = EK : ZL = r, where TH and r are given, then it Comparative analysis in Greek geometrycan be shown that (ZM Â TE) = (TL Â LM), so that by applying the given rectangle (ZM Â TE) to the given line TM and deficient by a square, LM 2 , [Elements VI 28] , point L will be given. Hence, line HL is given. Diorism. (a) Since it is not always possible to apply the rectangle (ZM Â TE) to TM deficient by a square -the condition is that ðZM Â TEÞ 6
and TH : ZM 0 = EK 0 : ZL 0 = r 0 , is solved using an analyzed proposition. That is, for the purposes of the diorism, we consider a new ratio, r 0 , that is not given, but which is found satisfying the stated conditions. 28 It is shown that point M 0 is determined when L 0 E is a mean proportional between TE and EZ, that is,
is applied to TM 0 , the special case is a limiting case [Elements II 5] . It is shown through a comparative analyzed proposition that HL 0 cuts off the least ratio of any line drawn from H and falling on rays EB and ZG. (c) It is shown through another comparative analyzed proposition that lines closer to HL 0 always cut of greater ratios from rays EB and ZG than lines farther from HL 0 . Synthesis. Using the special case of Diorism (a), line HL 0 is constructed so that there are three cases depending on the relation r T EK 0 : EL 0 . The solutions and the limits of solubility are handled separately. Determination of the Limit. The limit 29 of the ratio is shown to be given as
There are two comparative-analyzed propositions in this occurrence. We will examine that denoted as Diorism (b). We should note that, although this occurs within the diorism of Cutting off a Ratio I 6.2, it is a complete analyzed proposition, so it has, itself, both an analysis and a synthesis. For this proposition, we begin with the three conditions of the special case, Diorism (a), which in terms of the letter names for this proposition, Fig. 7 , are as follows: TE : EK = EK : EZ, KM = TK, and (TE Â MZ) = (MK Â KT). We then draw another line through H and falling on rays EB and ZG, say HNS, and seek a relation between ratio EL : ZK and ratio ES : ZN. The text of Cutting off a Ratio I 6.2 Diorism (b) reads as follows:
[1] First, we seek ( ) if line KL cuts a ratio, which is the ratio LE to ZK, greater or less than all of the [other] lines that extend from point H and cut the two lines EB and EG.
28 See Saito and Sidoli [2010, 6-1-608] for further discussion of this type of diorism. 29 The term used here is , whose plural often translates the plural of o \ qoB and, in that case, means mathematical definitions [Rashed and Bellosta, 2010, 193] . Here, however, what is being expressed is the limit of the given ratio for which solutions are possible. Since the word literally means boundary or extremity, we have translated with limit, but we should point out that this does not mean a rigorously defined limit in anything like the modern sense. Rashed and Bellosta [2010, 192-193] have translated with "la détermination du rapport," which is also possible, but which might give the reader the incorrect impression that the final section of the occurrence gives an evaluation of the general ratio, r, as opposed to an evaluation of the special case of the limiting ratio, r 0 . 30 This final, subtracted term is literally described as "the line that is equal in square to four times TE by EZ" [Rashed and Bellosta, 2010, 193] . Pappus, in Collection VII prop. 17, shows how to construct a line that is equal to the final difference of Apollonius' proportion, ððTE þ EZÞ À ð ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi 4ðTE Â EZÞ p ÞÞ [Jones, 1986, 137] . This passage also gives a sense of the type of Greek that was used to express these objects, although Apollonius almost certainly did not express the line that was the side of the square by name, as is indicated in the Arabic.
We find this problem ( ) as follows. 31 When the things maintain their configuration with respect to the parallel line, and we take a line as a mean between TE and EZ, with respect to ratio, 32 line EK. And we join line HK and we extend it rectilinearly. It is necessary that we seek if line HL cuts the ratio LE to ZK greatest or least of those which the [other] lines cut, which extend from point H and cutting the two lines EB and ZG.
[2] We cut off a line, line KM, equal to line TK.
33 So, rectangle TE by MZ 34 is equal to rectangle MK by KT, 35 and the ratio LE to KZ is equal to the ratio TH to ZM. 36 We produce another line on it, HS. [Sefrin-Weis, 2010, 63-65] .) Although Rashed and Bellosta [2010, 471-472] associate the usage in these places with those of the determination of the limit, in which the root is certainly being used, the two are conceptually unrelated. The former has to do with the verb which is used with the noun to express the idea of solving a problem, whereas the latter concerns the expression of a limiting case of the given ratio, what we have called r 0 , in terms of given segments. Since the mathematical argument that follows is a theoretic analyzed proposition, one may legitimately ask what Apollonius means by the statement "we find the problem." Indeed, the problem in question is the general problem of determining whether HL cuts off the greatest or least ratio of all the lines falling from point H on the two the specified rays. Apollonius solves this problem in two steps; he shows, first, that HL cuts off the least (or greatest) ratio of any of these lines and, second, that the ratios cut off by such lines always increase (or decrease) as the lines are taken farther away from HL. We discuss this issue further at the end of this section. 32 The expression "a mean between AB and GD, with respect to ratio" is the idiom used to denote a mean proportional. 33 This is the condition that determines point M, set out in Diorism (a). 34 The expression can be read literally as "the surface AB by CD" ( ). 35 The equality of these two rectangles is demonstrated in the general analysis and follows as a resultof the construction of point M through the relation TH : ZM = EL : ZK. 36 This is the principal construction of the general analysis, which determines the point M. 37 The manuscripts disagree about whether this is HS or HN [CR A, 10v; [S3] So, when we alternate, the ratio SE to NZ is greater than the ratio TH to MZ.
[S2] But, the ratio TH to ZM is as the ratio LE to ZK, 40 [S1] so the ratio SE to NZ is greater than the ratio LE to ZK.
[6] Therefore, line HL cuts a ratio less than the ratio that HS cuts. Likewise, we prove that it cuts a ratio less than the ratios that all the [other] lines cut that are produced from point H and cut the two lines ZG and EB. So, line HL cuts a ratio less than the ratio that is cut by all the [other] lines that are produced from point H and cut the two lines ZG and EB. [Rashed and Bellosta, 2010, 185-189] The steps of this comparative-analyzed proposition may be sketched as follows. Section [1] provides an exposition and description of the problem. We draw line HL according to the condition determined in the special case of Diorism (a), namely by joining point H with a point K taken such that TE : EK = EK : EZ [Elements VI 13] . It is then necessary to see if HL cuts the greatest or the least ratio of all lines falling from point H to the rays EB and ZG. Section [2] sets out the other condition of the special case, KM = TK, and reminds the reader that (TE Â MZ) = (MK Â KT) and EL: ZK = TH : ZM, as was shown in Diorism (a). A new line, HS, is drawn and the specification of the problem is given. 
But, in the general analysis, point M was determined by the proportion
38 See Rashed and Bellosta [2010, 473-474] for a discussion of this and related expressions. A argument for reading the verb somewhat abstractly as "we relate" can be based on the introduction of Thābit ibn Qurra's On the Composition of Ratios, where he tells us that Euclid defined a ratio as "some relation belonging to homogeneous quantities" [Lorch, 2001, 168] . The word that Thābit uses for relation, or comparison, is , based on the same root as . 39 This is a direct consequence of Elements II 5. 40 This is how point M was originally determined. 41 The use of (?) indicates a relation that is either greater than, equals, or less than and upon which various operations can be performed. See the commentary following this proposition. 
But, since MSEN is similar to MHTN, by Elements VI 4,
So, by substitution of (A5) into (A4),
and when we compose,
that is,
Hence, we must find the following relation: Finally, Section [6] reiterates the overall goal of the analyzed proposition and points out that this serves as a proof that line HL cuts off the least ratio of any line falling from point H onto the rays EB and ZG. What distinguishes this proposition as a comparative analysis is the argument of the analysis itself, which relies on the claim that there has to be some relationship between certain pairs of ratios, or rectangles, and which proceed by performing operations on these unknown relations in such a way that we can see that the unknown relation functions as a conceptual unit. This is what we have tried to capture with the, perhaps, strange symbolism A(?)B. The analysis consists of a series of operations carried out on this as yet unknown relation, which Apollonius knows must exist because it is simply one of the relations greater than, equal to, or lesser than. The verification, or determination, of the relation is then a statement about what this relation is, which can be determined on the basis of the geometry of the figure and the assumptions of the theorem. In this case, this section is a single statement, but in other cases, as we will see below, the determination of this ratio may require a bit more work.
These sorts of ratio manipulations are justified in the Elements for proportions and for the transformation between a proportion and an equality made up of the sides of a rectangle, but readers of Aristarchus, Archimedes, and Apollonius will have long noticed that these mathematicians often use such operations on inequalities and ratio-inequalities as well. 45 Indeed, in this text, Apollonius assumes that these operations can be performed on generalized relations that may be either proportions, ratio-inequalities, equalities, or inequalities.
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Some five centuries later, Pappus, in his Collection VII, provided proofs that extended to ratio inequalities the applicability of all the ratio operations commonly in use, including a few that were not included in the Elements [Jones, 1986, 128-130] . This presumably means that in Pappus's time there was no treatise available to him that provided justification for these operations. Of course, it is possible that such a treatise had existed but was subsequently lost. It seems more likely, however, that no such treatise ever existed and that the Hellenistic geometers used these operations because they are simple, and obvious, extensions of a set of practices that were well established, assured in the conviction that if pressed they could supply a proof to justify their practice. This means that, in this regard, ancient mathematicians probably read the Elements V as a work that sought to give certain logical foundations to some of their practices, not as a work that told them what they could and could not do.
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Another characteristic feature of a comparative analysis is that it is clearly a heuristic tool. In most of the surviving standard theoretic analyzed propositions, and indeed in Pappus's description of theoretic analysis, the analysis begins with the assumption of what is to be shown and then proceeds, through an examination of the consequences of this assumption, to show something that is obviously true or that the geometer knows can be shown independently of the analytical assumption. The synthesis is then usually an inversion of the argument in the analysis, often in exactly the same steps, and is, hence, frequently omitted in the theoretic analyzed propositions that survive in our sources. Indeed, the argument in Cutting off a Ratio I 6.4 Diorism (b) can easily be turned into a standard analyzed proposition. To do this, we simply have to assume, in step (A1), that ES : ZN > EL : ZK. We can then work through the same series of steps to show that this implies that (ET Â ZM) > (MN Â NT), which can be confirmed independently by means of Elements II 5. In this case, for all practical purposes, the synthesis is unnecessary.
In this way, comparative analysis provided techniques for investigating relations about which the geometer may initially have known nothing. Indeed, since Apollonius could 45 See Berggren and Sidoli [2007, 225-227] for a recent discussion of these issues. 46 Historians of Greek mathematics have come to distinguish between equalities of numbers or magnitudes and proportions, which are generally asserted by Greek mathematicians as an identity of two or more ratios. This distinction follows the linguistic practice of the ancient mathematicians. Indeed, Greek mathematicians often say that two ratios are the "same" when a proportion holds, but ratios are never said to be "equal" (see Elements V def. 3, where ratio is defined a sort of relation; thus two ratios or relations can be the same, but not equal). Nevertheless, as this paragraph makes clear, the ancient mathematicians clearly recognized the formal similarity between these different types of relations and subjected them to the same operations without comment. 47 See Saito [2003, 336-341] for an argument that Elements V is not meant to be an exhaustive and general "theory of ratio" but was, rather, meant to provide a justification of various tools that were used in geometrical investigations.
easily have framed the comparative-analyzed propositions of Cutting off a Ratio in the form of a standard theoretic analyzed proposition, which assumes what it sets out to prove, he may well have written them up in the form that he did in order to help readers develop an idea of useful tactics that can be employed when investigating unknown relations.
Indeed, the comparative theoretic analyses provided by Apollonius illustrate a generally applicable approach. They show that, simply by assuming that there is some relation, we can use the techniques of analysis to investigate the nature of this relation. Once we have assumed some relation between any two objects that we want to relate, we can proceed, through a series of deductive steps, to look for an unknown relation that we can then establish by independent means. In the case of Cutting off a Ratio I 6.2 Diorism (b), we come to the relation (ET Â ZM)(?)(MN Â NT), which Apollonius must have seen at once could be decided on the basis of Elements II 5, since he has already shown, in the general analysis, that (ET Â ZM) = (MK Â TK).
In the case of comparative analysis, since the geometer has not assumed what is to be shown, it is both logically and heuristically important that the synthesis be given in full, since it will rarely be obvious, after a series of operations, what the established relation will imply for the unknown relation that was assumed at the beginning of the analysis. From a logical perspective, we must still verify that all of the steps of the analysis are convertible and from a heuristic perspective, we must follow through this chain of steps to see what the determined relation implies for the assumed relation.
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In Cutting off a Ratio I 6.2 Diorism (c), Apollonius goes on to use another comparative analyzed proposition to show that any line beyond HNS passing through point H and falling on lines EB and ZG will cut off a ratio still less than that cut off by HNS. We will omit this argument and in its place examine the analogous argument given in Cutting off a Ratio I 6.4.
This occurrence handles the situation represented in Fig. 5 (d) . In terms of the diagram given in the text, Fig. 8 , Cutting off a Ratio I 6.4 treats the case where line HKL falls on rays EA and ZD. In this occurrence, the ratio EK : ZL = r 0 , which is cut off by line HL, is a maximum, not a minimum. Hence, in this regard the argument below is opposite to that found in Cutting off a Ratio I 6.2 Diorism (c), but in all other ways it is analogous. In Cutting off a Ratio I 6.4 Diorism (c), in order to show that the ratios continuously increase as the line approaches HL, Apollonius draws another line, HF, cutting AB and GD at Q and F, respectively, and shows that ES : ZN > EQ : ZF. For this purpose, he sets out a point O, analogous to point M, such that ES : ZN = TH : ZO, and points out that, by the same argument as in the general analysis, (ZO Â TE) = (TN Â NO).
With this as preliminary, the text of Cutting off a Ratio I 6.4 Diorism (c) proceeds as follows.
[1] . . . So, we produce another line on it, as HF. Rashed and Bellosta [2010, 205 l.14] follow the manuscripts and read where we read . As their notes point out a few lines below, however, the manuscripts often read where would make better sense [Rashed and Bellosta, 2010, 205 l.18] . 50 See Footnote 42, above. 51 This is a generalization of the ratio operation by conversion, defined in Elements V def. 16. Although this operation was not justified in the Elements, it was widely used in practice for both proportions and ratio inequalities. 52 See Footnote 44, above. Here again, Rashed and Bellosta [2010, 205 l.18 57 This is the conclusion of the section that determines the relation and is also the starting point of the synthesis. 58 This is a reminder of a statement proved in the preliminary to the analyzed proposition.
rectangle TN by NO.
[S6] But rectangle TN by NO is the equal of rectangle TE by ZO, 59 so rectangle TF by FO is less than rectangle TE by ZO.
[S5] So, the ratio FT to TE is less than the ratio ZO to OF [Elements VI 14] .
[S4] And when we convert, the ratio TF to FE, namely the ratio TH to EQ [Elements VI 4] , is greater than the ratio OZ to ZF, 60 [S3] and by alteration, the ratio TH to ZO is greater than the ratio EQ to ZF [Elements V 16] . [S2] And the ratio TH to ZO is as the ratio ES to ZN [by construction], [S1] so the ratio ES to ZN is greater than the ratio EQ to ZF.
In Cutting off a Ratio I 6.4 Diorism (c), the verb that is used for what we are seeking to do with the two ratios has changed from "to relate" or "to compare" (root ) into "to link" or "to join" (root ) . Nevertheless, what we are seeking is still referred to with the same noun ( ). As we will argue below, this may have been due to the fact that there was no verb in the Greek text and the translator was working to try to convey an idea that was handled in the Greek by prepositional phrases in a more natural Arabic style. We will return to this question once we have examined a Greek text that contains a comparativeanalytic argument.
In Cutting off a Ratio I 6.4 Diorism (c), we encounter a longer verification that is expressed in five sentences, [V1]- [V5] . Whereas in Cutting off a Ratio I 6.2 Diorism (b) the verification was handled with a single sentence, here it is developed into a section of the proof that, itself, seems to have an internal comparative-analytical argument. 61 In fact, however, the verification of this proposition is also established directly on the basis of two assumptions of the theorem and a pair equations that are contrived for this purpose. Although the verification is carried out in five statements, and hence might be thought to be analogous to the extended verification we encountered in the introduction, from a logical perspective it has the same structure as that in Cutting off a Ratio I 6.2 Diorism (b).
In Cutting off a Ratio I 6.4 Diorism (c), the analysis, Section [1], establishes through the series of steps [A1]-[A10] that we can state the relation ES : EN(?)EQ : ZF once we know the relation (TL Â LO)(?)(ZO Â TE), while the synthesis, Section [4], shows that once this relation is found to be (ZO Â TE) < (TL Â LO) we can work our way through the exact same series of steps, [S9]-[S1], to show that ES : EN > EQ : ZF. The argument of the verification for Cutting off a Ratio I 6.4 Diorism (c) can be summarized as follows.
In order to determine the relation (TL Â LO)(?)(ZO Â TE), we can consider what happens when we take away equals from these. By the argument in the general analysis, we have ðTL Â LMÞ ¼ ðTE Â ZMÞ; ðV1Þ so we can subtract these from the terms in the relation we seek, producing a pair of equations, 
This statement, which is the conclusion of the verification, is also the starting point of the synthesis [V5, S10]. As we can see, this argument is simply the assertion of two claims that derive from the geometry of the figure, (V1) and (V4), and the contrivance of a pair of equations, (V2), that will lead directly to the result we seek. Moreover, there is no natural way of reversing the argument of this verification and turning it into an extension of the analysis, in such a way as to make this extended verification unnecessary, as was possible in our example of a standard theoretic analyzed proposition. All that this verification does is show directly on the basis of statements already shown and the geometry of the figure that there is, indeed, a relation between (TL Â LO) and (TE Â ZO) -which was never really in doubt -by showing what this relation is. Indeed, the synthesis begins with the final statement of the verification, not the final statement of the analysis proper, as is the case in a standard theoretic analyzed proposition.
Hence, we have highlighted another key difference between a comparative and a standard theoretic analysis. In a standard theoretic analysis, because we assume precisely what we are setting out to show, it is enough to reduce the proposition to a claim that can be established on the basis of the conditions of the theorem and the geometry of the figure.
In the case of a comparative analysis, however, because what is assumed is simply the existence of some relation, once we have reduced the assumed relation to a more manageable relation, we still have to determine what this relation is. This determination may be immediate, or it may take a little work, but its result is the necessary starting point of the synthesis. For these reasons, the longer verifications that we find in some of Apollonius's comparative analyses are an essential part of the argument and cannot be subsumed into the analysis by working them backward.
Apollonius's comparative theoretic analyses, then, have the following structure. They begin with the assumption that some relation exists between two objects that the geometer is seeking to compare. The analysis proceeds by treating this unknown relation as a conceptual unit and subjecting it to a series of operations until it has been transformed into a relation that the geometer knows can be established by independent means. The verification then establishes the nature of this relation based on the geometry of the figure and any assumptions of the theorem. With the relation established, the synthesis then begins from the claim of the verification and works back through the same steps as the analysis to produce the sought relation. Since the relation was assumed as unknown, the synthesis is needed to show what the originally assumed relation is.
In the context of the extended diorisms of Cutting off a Ratio, these two theoretic analyzed propositions can be taken as a proof that, where L bisects TM, line HL cuts off the greatest, or least, ratio drawn from point H to lines EA and ZD and that all other lines cut off ratios that always approach the maximum, or minimum, ratio cut off by HL as the lines themselves approach HL. Hence, this pair of analyzed propositions are about maxima and minima, as can be seen by comparing the arguments in these propositions with the theorems that demonstrate the properties of maximum and minimum lines in circles, Elements III 7 and 8, or conic sections, Conics V.
In four of the five cases where this pair of comparative analyzed propositions is used, the text refers to the pair as handling a "problem" ( ). 63 In terms of the usual language of Greek geometry, this is a peculiar expression, because a problem is generally solved by the construction of a particular geometric object. In this case, we should probably think of the problem as determining whether or not the line falling from the given point onto the given rays cuts off a minimum or maximum ratio. In each case, the text states that we need to determine whether or not the line determined in Diorism (a) cuts off the greatest or the least ratio. This is then followed by the pair of comparative analyses that we have examined. Taken together, this pair of propositions shows that the ratio so cut off is a unique maximum, or minimum. Hence, we should understand the problem as being a determination of what kind of limiting ratio is cut off and whether or not it is unique.
Comparative analysis in Pappus's Collection VI
As part of his treatment of Theodosius's Spherics III 6, in Collection VI props. 16-20, Pappus uses comparative analysis four times [Hultsch, 1876, 494-512] . Ostensibly, these propositions all concern the size relations between certain arcs of one great circle and their orthogonal projections onto another great circle. In fact, however, they are a treatment of what we would call the right ascensions of arcs of the ecliptic, or what the ancients understood as the rising times of arcs of the ecliptic for observers at the terrestrial equator. The issue was not purely academic, however, since the rising times of arcs of the ecliptic as seen at latitudes where ancient observers actually did live, were determined on the basis of those at the terrestrial equator.
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As an example of Pappus's use of comparative analysis, we will look at Collection VI prop. 16. In Fig. 9 (see also Fig. 10 ), this theorem shows that where BEKXG is a great circle Fig. 9 . Collection VI prop. 16. 63 The statement "we find this problem" ( ) occurs at the beginning of the Diorism (b) section of Cutting off a Ratio I 6.2, 6.4, 7.2 and 7.4 [Rashed and Bellosta, 2010, 185, 203, 223, 239] . See Footnote 31 for our reading of these passages. The first time a similar pair of analyses occurs is at the beginning of Cutting off a Ratio I 5.3 Diorism (b). In this place, the text reads "We know this as follows" ( ) [Rashed and Bellosta [2010, 167] ]. 64 For a full discussion of Pappus' treatment of Theodosius's Spherics, see Malpangotto [2003] .
inclined on another great circle, BZLCG, arc BE > arc XG and arc EK = arc KX, then the projections of arcs EK and KX on great circle BZLCG, determined by great circles drawn through the pole of circle BZLCG, are such that arc ZL > arc LC.
The argument proceeds as follows. Arc GM is set out equal to arc BE and great circle DM is drawn through to point N. Since arc BE = arc GM, a circle ESM can be drawn about pole D. The center of the sphere is taken at O [Spherics I 2] , and line DO is joined perpendicular to circle BZLCG and passing through the center of circle ESM at point P. Line EM is joined and extended to point T and line OX is joined and extended to meet point T. Lines EO, ORK, PR, RS, PH, and HT are joined.
It is then shown that lines PR and RS form a straight line, PRS, by showing that the three points lie in the planes of the two circles ESM and DKL; and, likewise, that lines PH and HT form a straight line, PHT, by showing that the three points lie in the planes of the two circles ESM and DXC. Hence, in the plane of triangle EOT, since they subtend equal arcs, angle EOK = angle ROT, and EO : OT = ER : RT [Elements VI 3] . Pappus then uses a comparative-analytical argument, which we quote in full.
[A1] Since, however, I seek what arc ZL is to LC (fgsx s ıB g , ZK peqi/e qeia s z g KH),
[A2] that is ES to SH [Spherics I 10] [V1] PE, however, is equal to PH.
[V2] Clearly, a comparison obtains (e ' 0 vei d g r tcjqirim), for it is greater. [Hultsch, 1876, 496-498] The synthesis then proceeds by starting with the relations TP > PH = PE, and working backward through the steps of the analysis to show that, in fact, arc ZL > arc LC. Just as was the case with the comparative analyses of Cutting off a Ratio, since all of the operations used in this analyzed proposition are reversible, Pappus could have saved himself the trouble of writing out the synthesis if he had started the analysis with the assumption that arc ZL > arc LC. Instead, however, he started with the more general assumption that there is some relation, arc ZL (?) arc LC, and used analysis to determine what this relation is. In this case, a synthesis is necessary, because it is not immediately obvious that TP > PH implies that arc ZL > arc LC.
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Hence, we see that the structure of these comparative analyses in Collection VI are the same as those in Cutting off a Ratio. The analysis starts with the relation that we wish to establish asserted as an unknown relation. It then performs a series of transformations on this relation, using ratio operations and considerations of the geometry of the figure, until it arrives at a relation that can be determined independently. The verification then determines this relation. In this case, the determination can be made in a single statement, based on the geometry of the figure. The synthesis, then, works back through the steps of the analysis. In both Cutting off a Ratio and Collection VI, the steps of the analysis are literally taken in reverse. Nevertheless, this reversal of the order of steps need not have been done so exactly.
Although the structure of the argument is the same in the diorisms of Cutting off a Ratio and the theoretic analyses of Pappus's comments on Theodosius's Spherics III 6, the language is somewhat different between the two texts. Cutting off a Ratio proceeds by stating that it is "necessary to relate (or link) two magnitudes (or ratios)," while, in the Collection, Pappus says "I will seek what some magnitude (or ratio) is to another." Whereas the Greek text expresses this using a pronoun and the dative case, the Arabic uses a verbal expression. It may well have been the case that Pappus's Greek expression was grammatically similar to what he read in Apollonius's Greek version of Cutting off a Ratio and that, when Cutting off a Ratio was translated into Arabic, this phrase was rendered into more natural Arabic with the verbal expressions that we saw. Both texts agree, however, that what is found is 67 The operation of separation can be applied to this unknown relation by considering MPOE and MPOT, so that by Elements I 47,
and
68 It should be noted, however, that once Pappus gives the full synthesis for Collection VI prop. 16, he regards the production of the syntheses for Collection VI props. 17, 19, and 20, which are analogous, as too trivial to warrant full treatment.
some relation, or comparison (r tcjqiriB, ). Since Pappus was well acquainted with the Greek text of Cutting off a Ratio, it clear that Pappus's procedure in Collection VI was influenced by the type of analysis used by Apollonius in the extended diorisms of Cutting off a Ratio.
Comparative analysis is thus the determination of the type of relation that obtains between two terms. Hence, although from a logical perspective the structure of this type of theoretic analysis is the same as that in which we assume a specific relation, from a practical perspective it is more open-ended than a standard analysis and it is indisputably a heuristic approach.
Whereas a standard theoretic analysis starts with the assumption that what one wants to prove holds, a comparative analysis begins with the more general claim that there is some relation between two terms. In other words, at the beginning of a standard theoretic analysis, the mathematician must have good reason to believe that theorem to be shown in fact holds, whereas a comparative analysis can begin with the trivial assumption that there is a relation and then proceed to use the propositions of the Elements, ratio manipulation, geometric constructions, and so on, to come to some understanding of the specifics of the relation in question.
Finally, we should add that Pappus's use of analysis in these propositions of Collection VI did not escape the careful attention of Commandino, in the 16th century. Although Commandino noted the use of analysis in these propositions and pointed out that the language is peculiar, he does not seem to have regarded the comparative analysis itself as in any way remarkable. In his note to the beginning of the comparative analysis quoted above, Commandino says, "In this place, Pappus somehow uses analysis, although he employs a novel and unusual way of speaking." 
Conclusions
We are now in position to give an overview of comparative analysis, which will allow us to relate this particular type of theoretic analysis to the standard form of theoretic analysis. For this purpose, we can use a schematic similar to that which we used to describe standard theoretic analysis.
Once again, we begin with the assumption of some relation, R a , which we say obtains for some members of an assumed set of given objects, x 1 , . . ., x k . We then perform a series of manipulations on this assumed relation, transforming it into a another relation, R t , which holds between some other members of the same given set, and which can be immediately established on the basis of the conditions of the theorem, C(x 1 , . . ., x k ).
The verification, then, confirms the general claim that there is some relation R t , by showing a specific relation, R t 0 , that holds for the same objects as R t , which are members of the original set of given objects, x 1 , . . ., x k . In Fig. 11 , we have represented this by depicting R t 0 ðx 1 ; . . . ; x k Þ as a subset of R t (x 1 , . . ., x k ), so it is clear that establishing R t 0 ðx 1 ; . . . ; x k Þ acts both as a confirmation of R t (x 1 , . . ., x k ) and provides the starting point for the synthesis, which will proceed by working back toward the original R a using the same set of given theorems and operations, Toolbox A .
In a comparative analysis, the synthesis can generally proceed by the same series of steps as the analysis, because these are manipulations and substitutions that all have straightforward converses. Nevertheless, because these steps can be drawn directly from the general toolbox as well as consequences of the assumption and Toolbox A , established in the analysis, as usual there is no need for the synthesis to mirror the temporal ordering of the analysis. In any case, the synthesis begins with R t 0 ðx 1 ; . . . ; x k Þ and works back toward the relation which was assumed in the analysis until it arrives at R a 0 ðx 1 ; . . . ; x k Þ, which is a specific, instantiated relation that holds for the same set of objects as R a (x 1 , . . ., x k ). Hence in the schematic, we have depicted R a 0 ðx 1 ; . . . ; x k Þ as a subset of R a (x 1 , . . ., x k ). Even in the case that all of the steps of the analysis are directly reversible, if the relation R t 0 is greater or less than, it will be necessary to go through with the synthesis to confirm which one of these applies to R a 0 .
It may be helpful to consider this schematic in terms of one of the examples we have seen. In Collection VI prop. 16, R a (x 1 , . . ., x k ) is the claim that there is some relation between arcs ZL and LC, [A1]. That is, one of the relations ZL > LC, ZL = LC, or ZL < LC. The analysis then transforms this into a new relation between lines TP and PE, [A11], namely one of the relations TP > PE, TP = PE, or TP < PE. Note that the objects related in the assumed and transformed statements, the arcs ZL, LC and the lines TP and PE, belong to the original set of instantiated objects, x 1 , . . ., x k , but are different members. The verification then shows that TP > PE, [V2], which is represented by R t 0 ðx 1 ; . . . ; x k Þ, and is clearly a verification of the general claim of the transformation. The synthesis then works backwards to show that arcZL < arcLC, which is R a 0 ðx 1 ; . . . ; x k Þ.
We turn now to the important question of the extent to which comparative analysis, and theoretic analysis in general, were heuristic techniques for Greek mathematicians. It used to be taken more or less for granted that Greek geometric analysis was a heuristic technique.
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More recently, however, the extent to which analysis can function as a set of heuristic techniques has been called in to question. Following a sustained account of the heuristic role of problematic analysis, Knorr [1986, 358-360] argued that theoretic analyzed propositions should not be understood as heuristic, and, indeed, were not proper analyses at all. 71 More recently still, Netz [2000] has argued that problematic analysis was also not heuristic, except 70 This is expressed, for example, by Hintikka and Remes [1974, 1] in their opening sentence, with the statement that analysis is a method that was used "in looking for proofs . . . and constructions. . .". 71 In fact, Knorr [1986, 358-359] was apparently of the opinion that the idea of theoretic analysis was something that Pappus simply invented, but that had no basis in older mathematical practice. The fact that there are a number of theoretic analyses in Apollonius' Cutting off a Ratio, however, suffices to show that Pappus was discussing a category of text that he found in his sources, not just one that he used himself.
in the limited sense of revealing "the idea behind the solution."
72 Since only Knorr's argument is addressed to theoretic analysis, we will direct our attention to it in what follows.
In the first place, as many scholars have pointed out, there are two primary ways in which we can understand the claim the analysis was heuristic -that is, (1) that it could help mathematicians find a new solution to a problem or a new proof for a theorem, or (2) that it could lead them to previously unconsidered problems or to previously unknown theorems.
When we say that problematic analysis lead to new solutions, we mean that it provided a set of techniques that mathematicians could use to look for unknown solutions to extant problems. When we say that problematic analysis lead to new problems, we mean that the analytical investigation of some given configuration of objects, often involved a transformation to a new problem, whose solution was then sought. Mahoney [1969, 330-348] and Knorr [1986] , among others, have argued at length that problematic analysis functioned in both of these ways for Greek mathematicians and that the problematic analyses that survive in our sources can be taken as evidence of this activity.
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When we say that theoretic analysis led to new proofs, we mean that it could be used to find a valid demonstration of some mathematical claim which the mathematician already believed to be true. When we say that theoretic analysis led to new theorems, we mean that it could be used to investigate a given configuration of geometric objects to reveal something that holds for them, but that was not known beforehand.
There can be little doubt that theoretic analysis could, in fact, be used to find a proof for something that the geometer believed to be true. Indeed, the standard theoretic analyses in Pappus' Collection are of this type. After years of reading the Hellenistic geometers, it is unlikely that Pappus would have encountered a statement in Apollonius that was unclear to him and wondered if it were really true. Rather, he would, naturally, assume that it was true and wonder why it was true. The theoretic analysis that we encountered in the introduction is the natural answer to such a question. Looking back at Fig. 1 , the original claim that (BG Â GD) : (BE Â ED) = GA 2 : AE 2 is true can be seen to follow as a result of the fact that HZ k BG. Pappus' theoretic analysis both shows how we could provide a proof of the theorem, and also highlights the key geometric fact that unlocks the demonstration. It is not only in reading and understanding the works of other mathematicians, however, that such methods would have been useful. 74 In the course of a mathematical investigation of new territory, the geometer will often have encountered results that seemed to be true, but that were unproven, or results that, if true, would lead to the development of new areas of the 72 There are difficulties involved in interpreting Netz's position exactly, because he seems to move effortlessly between the concept of analysis as a method, or a body of mathematical techniques, and analysis as a type of mathematical text, or an analyzed proposition. Although, his main focus is an investigation of the reasons that Greek mathematicians might have had for publishing analyzed propositions, when he comes to addressing the question "Is analysis 'heuristic'?" he often appears to be discussing analysis as a body of techniques [Netz, 2000, 139-145] . Whatever his exact position, however, it should be clear that the question of whether or not a given analyzed proposition is an accurate depiction of a heuristic process that actually occurred has no direct bearing on the question of whether or not analytical techniques were generally used by mathematicians as heuristic tools. 73 Notice that Netz [2000] appears to be arguing against this position, although he does not systematically refute the examples that others have advanced. 74 We do not mean to underestimate the importance of reading and understanding the works of others as a mathematical activity in antiquity. The general uniformity of shared assumptions, applied techniques and even linguistic expressions make it clear that ancient mathematicians read each others work in detail, often mastering both the results and the methods.
theory. In such circumstances, the techniques of theoretical analysis would have been quite useful.
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The usefulness of theoretic analysis for the discovery of previously unknown mathematical theorems, however, is not so readily apparent. As Knorr [1986, 358] argued, the theoretic analysis that are found in the medieval manuscripts as alternative proofs for Elements XIII 1-5 seem to be rather contrived [Heiberg, 1969, 198-204] . 76 Even if we read them as showing how to find a proof, given the theorem, they are somehow unsatisfactory because, for these theorems, it is not clear how the discovery of the theorem can be explained independently of the discovery of the proof. 77 Comparative analysis, however, as we saw above, is an approach that can be taken when we do not know what we want to show, but only what objects we want to relate. In order to see if these kinds of arguments would be useful in simultaneously discovering one of these theorems and motivating the demonstration, we will look at Elements XIII 1, which has been discussed by Mahoney [1969, 326-327] and Knorr [1986, 358] .
If we take an analytical approach to Elements XIII 1, using the techniques of comparative analysis, as we have seen them developed in this paper, in Fig. 12 , we can start with the conditions that the line AB has been divided such that AB : AC = AC : CB and that AD ¼ 1 2 AB. If we want a relation involving AD 2 and CD 2 , then we take as an analytical assumption that such a relation exists. That is, we seek
But since AD ¼ 1 2 AB,
substituting (A2) into (A1), we can seek
Then we complete the squares on AB and CD [Elements I 46] , extend FC to meet KE at G and AK to H, and complete the square DH and the two parallelograms CH and HL [Elements I post. 2, I 46]. Now since, AK = 2AH, by Elements I 36, rectangle AG is twice rectangle CH, and since, by Elements I 43, rectangle CH is equal to rectangle HL,
But one of the conditions of the theorem is that AB : AC = AC : CB, so by Elements VI 16, AC 2 ¼ AB Â CB; that is; Ã HF ¼ ' CE:
75 As Knorr [1986, 358] points out, the theoretic analyzed propositions in our sources arise in a context in which key elements of their proof will also be clear. Nevertheless, even in cases where one has strong reasons for believing that certain theorems will be key members of Toolbox A , confirming that this is actually the case and obtaining a full set of the members of Toolbox A can done using a theoretical analysis. 76 These analyzed propositions are generally held to be interpolations, but it is not known by whom they were written or precisely when they were included in the text. 77 That is, here, as is often the case, the fact that that the theorem is true seems to arise in the same context in which one sees why the theorem is true.
Therefore,
So, substituting (A6) into (A3), we can seek
In this case, the verification is based immediately on the geometry of the figure. That is, this relation is known, since it is clear that
With this as a starting point, we can easily see how to produce a synthesis. Using an argument similar to that given in (A4)-(A6), we can show that
But, as we saw in (A2), AB 2 = 4AD 2 , so that
In this example, we see that the synthesis is only loosely modeled on the analysis. Indeed, the analysis does not provide us with a chain of logical inferences that we can then simply work backwards through in the synthesis. Rather, the analysis provides us with a number of relations that are directly related to our assumed relation, and which may be more easily determined from the original conditions. Moreover, in the course of this investigation, we have settled on a subset of the total available toolbox of theorems, operations and constructions that are relevant to the theorem at hand, Toolbox A . It is clear that the structure of the argument that we have presented here is the same as that in the comparative analyses found in our sources and set out in Fig. 11 .
It is not our intention to claim that any ancient mathematician actually made the argument we have given above. We merely wish to highlight the claim that comparative analysis could have been used as a heuristic tool, even in cases in which one did not know precisely what was to be shown. Of course, one must, first, have some idea of what objects one wants to compare in order to begin such an analysis, so it is not a completely unconstrained inquiry. This is not, however, an objection against a heuristic role for comparative analysis, since all meaningful mathematical investigation is directed toward some end. Another restriction is that comparative analysis can only investigate statements about relations, so that the theorems it produces would be statements of equalities or inequalities, proportions or ratio inequalities, and so forth. Nevertheless, this represents a fairly broad class of theorems.
In studying ancient analysis, we should try, so far as possible, to distinguish between analyzed propositions, a form of text that Greek mathematicians produced, a few of which are found in our sources, and the field of analysis, a loose body of techniques and practices that Greek mathematicians used in the process of actually doing mathematics -that is, reading and understanding mathematical texts and exploring and securing mathematical problems and results.
The analyzed propositions that survive belong, as Netz [2000, 145] has argued, to the "context of presentation," and should not be read as an accurate account of whatever heuristic processes lead to the discovery of the results they present. In this regard, we may take the analytical supplements to Elements XIII 1-5 as an example. These are almost certainly not meant to be read as an explanation of how the results of Elements XIII 1-5 were either discovered, or demonstrated, but rather as an exposition of a new style of mathematical argument, which was more formulaic and operational, in contrast to the older, strictly geometric style. They are very similar, in this regard, to the alternative, analytic reworking of Elements II, deriving from Heron's commentary to that book [Besthorn and Heiberg, 1897-1932, 8-78] . Probably, a full study should be carried out on these two groups of arguments; nevertheless, both seem to be using well-known examples to demonstrate a certain type of analytic approach. These propositions, then, should not be read as explanations of how certain theorems where shown, but rather as examples of how we can use a certain style of analytic approach. Apollonius' Cutting off a Ratio is also of this general class of text. It is not meant to answer any specific question we might have about how to cut two given lines in a given ratio, but rather to provide an exhaustive set of examples of how we can use analysis to approach problems.
In fact, probably all of the analyses that survive were written for some reason that can best be understood by considerations of the context of presentation. Nevertheless, this should not lead us to believe that the field of analysis as it was understood in antiquity, was primarily concerned with presentation, as opposed to discovery. The mere fact that entire treatises, such as the Data and the Conics, which were not themselves collections of analyzed propositions, were regarded by Pappus as essential to the field of analysis is evidence that Greek mathematicians wrote and organized their works to be of use, not just in understanding statements about mathematical objects, but also in the processes of actually doing mathematics. Indeed, the fact that Pappus himself regarded reading and teaching the classics as an important form of mathematical activity is an indication that he believed one could learn how to actually do mathematics through a careful reading of the Hellenistic mathematicians. 78 In order to understand the full extent of ancient Greek mathematical activity, from the limited sources available to us, we have to ask, not only what reasons these mathematicians would have had for structuring their specific arguments in the way they did, but also what general 78 For discussions of Pappus's rhetorical and scholarly approach see Cuomo [2000] and Bernard [2003] .
process of mathematical reasoning and techniques these sources reveal, and how these techniques might have been used in other applications, not directly found in our sources.
